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INTRODUCTION
Today's political and legal geography presents opportunities and
challenges not faced by the drafters of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("Universal Declaration")' some fifty years ago. The
shape, direction, and nature of State responses to human rights problems have dramatically altered. Non-State actors2 and transnational
networks3 now play a greater role in the promotion and protection of
human rights in local, regional, and international arenas. Concurrently, the challenges faced by the international community have
shifted from localized national security concerns to matters of a more
global nature, such as the environment, mass migration, and the human rights of women. The increase in non-State participants4 and the
1. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
2. See generally John Spanier, Who are the 'Non-State Actors?, in THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43 (William C. Olson ed.,

8th ed. 1991) (defining the term 'non-State actor'); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 50 (1994) (defining

"participants" to refer to all to whom international law is applicable). See generally
Benedict Kingsbury, Whose International Law? Sovereignty and Non-state
Groups, in Amir Pasic, TheoreticalPerspectives on the Transformation of Sovereignty, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1 (1994).
3. See, e.g.,
RONALD
INGLEHART,
MODERNIZATION
AND POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURE, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES

188-190 (1997) (stressing the importance of organizational networks); Victor
P~rez-Diaz, The Possibility of Civil Society: Transitions, Character and Challenges, in CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY, COMPARISON 80, 90 (John A. Hall

ed., 1995) (noting the emergence of economic, social, and informational networks); Timothy W. Luke, New World Order or Neo- World Orders: Power, Politics and Ideology in Informationalizing Glocalities, in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 91
(Mike Featherstone et al. eds., 1995) (discussing the emergence of local/global
"webs"); Patricia Chilton, Mechanics of Change: SocialMovements, Transnational
Coalitions, and the Transformation Process in Eastern Europe, in BRINGING
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC
STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 225 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed.,

1995) (explaining how "transnationalism takes account of coalitions of non-state
actors across national borders"). See generally Sol Piciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of NeoLiberalism, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1014 (1996); COALITIONS & POLITICAL
MOVEMENTS: THE LESSONS OF THE NUCLEAR FREEZE (Thomas R. Rochon &

David S. Meyer eds., 1997) (providing an excellent case study of the impact of international networks on global politics).
4. See HIGGINS, supra note 2, at 94 (noting that the use of the term 'participant' avoids the subject-object distinction in international law).
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emergence of transnational civil society' have opened a new domain
within which the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration and
other international human rights documents may be realized.
Variously termed "world, '6 "global, 7 "international," ' or "transnational" 9 civil society, this domain is the social, cultural, and ethnical arrangements of modem industrial society considered apart from
State control.' Transnational civil society refers to "a set of interactions among an imagined community to shape collective life that are
not confined to the territorial and institutional spaces of States.""
5. See, e.g., JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY & POLITICAL
THEORY (1992); Victor Prez-Diaz, The Possibili, of Civil Society: Transitions,
Characterand Challenges,in CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY, COMPARISON 90

(John A. Hall ed., 1995). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International
Law and InternationalRelations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary
Scholarship,92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 378 (1998); Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous
Peoples" In InternationalLaw: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1998).
6. See, e.g., RALF DAHRENDORF, THE MODERN SOCIAL CONFLICT 181 (1988).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD A. FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE: TOWARD A NEW
GLOBAL POLITICS 17 (1995); Stephen Gill, Reflections on Global Order and SociohistoricalTime, 16 ALTERNATIVES 311 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Non-governmental Organizationsin the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of InternationalCivil Sociey, 18 HUM. RTS. Q.
107 (1996).
9. See Timothy P. Terrell & Bernard L. McNamee, Transovereign,: Separating Human Rights from Traditional Sovereignty and the Implicationsfor the
Ethics of International Law Practice, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 459, 460 (1994)
(naming as examples of transovereigns "the Catholic Church, the environmental
'Green' movement, fundamentalist Islam, international communism, and in many
ways the United Nations.").
This article uses the term "transnational" throughout instead of "world" or
"global" because civil society is much more uneven and issue-specific than those
terms imply. The term "international" is avoided because it could too easily be
conflated with international regimes or States. "Transovereign" emphasizes a lack
of obedience to any particular sovereign and not merely the crossing of national
borders. Some commentators, however, have narrowed "transnational" to include
only structures that embody a moral commitment that requires "amore fundamental commitment to an organization's values and agenda than the ordinary NGO
would involve." Id. at 460 n.3.
10. See Ronnie Lipschutz, Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of
Global Civil Society, 21 MILLENNIUM J.INT'L STUDIES 389, 398 (1992).
11. Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: TransactionalCivil Society Targets Land Mines, 52 INT'L ORG. 613, 615 (1998).

1338

[14:1335

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

This is an appropriate description as no single map exists of transnational civil society, but rather a "network of strategizing and powers
and their articulation.' 2 The voluntary associations of transnational
civil society include such entities as non-governmental advocacy organizations, humanitarian service organizations, unions, religious
groups, civic and neighborhood associations, political and social
movements, information and news media, educational associations,
and certain forms of economic organization. 3 These entities link
themselves together in networks for particular political, social, and
cultural purposes. 4 The State boundary-crossing aspect of such associations makes them transnational; 5 their
voluntary, non-State as6
pects make them part of "civil society.'
Law plays a central role in civil society. Civil society cannot
flourish where there are inadequate legal assurances of their ability to
operate autonomously from government. Legal associations play a
central role in the development of civil society by supporting rule of
law mechanisms' 7 that permit the independent existence of non-

12. Stuart Hill, Brave New World, 21 SOCIALIST REV. 57, 63 (1991) (describing difficulties of adequately defining and describing civil society).
13. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 285 (1995) (noting that
while Hegel and his followers define civil society as that which is apart from the
State, many modern theorists see civil society as the space "mediating between
private markets and.., government."); Michael Walzer, A Better Vision: The Idea
of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction, DISSENT 293, 300 (1996) (presenting the more nuanced view that civil society may encompass certain economic
institutions, such as worker organizations and consumer cooperatives, that function
in private markets but have their origins outside the market). See also ROBERT L.
HEILBRONER,

BEYOND THE VEIL

OF ECONOMICS:

ESSAYS

IN WORLDLY

PHILOSOPHY 32 (1988) (proposing that economic processes are a prerequisite for
civil society); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 341 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing
that democratic civil society is incompatible with unrestricted private ownership).
14. See Lipschutz, supra note 10, at 393 (emphasizing that the concept of civil
society refers to something broader than social networks).

15. Cf Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 405, 412 (1997) (discussing the interaction of transnational individuals and groups apart from State systems).
16. See generally ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY

AND ITS RIVALS (1994) (discussing the origin and development of thinking about
civil society).
17. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (defining "rule of law"). See
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
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governmental entities and by encouraging the development of institutions that foster their growth. 8 A strong civil society also demands
and oversees legal constraints on State power and the accountability
of State actors. 9 Associational life provides an important medium for
the development of ideas about the role of law in society, such as the
parameters of civil freedoms and entitlements, the shape of legal
constraints on the exercise of public authority, and the definition of
public commitments.20
It is possible to view the idea of civil society through various political and philosophical lenses.2 ' For the purpose of examining the
promise of transnational civil society for human rights, a definitional
focus on relational networks helps to sharpen the inquiry. One proponent of this focus, Michael Walzer, writes that "[t]he words 'civil
society' name the space of uncoerced human association and also the
set of relational networks-formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology-that fill this space."' , Ideally, the associational
life of civil society is pluralistic and encouraging of diverse participation. 2' A primary measure of the strength of civil society is its caDiscourse,97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing the various definitions of "rule
of law").
18. See, e.g., John Reitz, Constitutionalisn and the Rule of Law: Theoretical
Perspectives, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND POST-COMMUNIST CHANGE 111 (Robert D. Grey ed., 1997).
19. See generally HELD, supra note 13 (discussing the accountability of State
actors in civil society).
20. See generally Luis Roniger, The ComparativeStudy of Clientelism and the
Changing Nature of Civil Society in the Contemporary World, in DEMOCRACY,
CLIENTELISM, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 6 (Luis Roniger & Ayse Gunes-Ayata eds.,
1994).
21. See generally THOMAS JANOSKI, CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1998);
PAUL BARRY CLARKE, DEEP CITIZENSHIP (1996); JUSTINE ROSENBERG, THE
EMPIRE OF CIVIL SOCIETY (1994); Guyora Binder, Post-TotalitarianPolitics,91
MICH. L. REV. 1491 (1993); COHEN & ARATO, supra note 5; ADAM B. SELIGMAN,
THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY (1992); Charles Taylor, Modes of Civil Socien, 3 PUB.
CULTURE 95 (1990); Daniel Bell, "American Exceptionalism "Revisited: The Role
of Civil Society, PUB. INTEREST 38 (1989); JOHN KEANE, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL
SOCIETY (1988).
22. Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL
DEMOCRACY 89, 89 (C. Mouffe ed., 1992); see also COHEN & ARATO, supra note
5, at 38.
23. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM,

MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK:

CIVIL
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pacity simultaneously to resist subordination to State authority and to
demand inclusion into State political structures.24 Human rights advocates argue that civil society creates a "setting of settings"2 in
which the human rights norms embodied in the Universal Declaration and its progeny are worked out, tested, and applied. Hence, the
importance of relational networks.
The rise of civil society presents a paradox to human rights advocates. On the one hand, civil society can promote human rights
norms and raise the concerns of unheard voices, including those of
people oppressed through violations of core principles of international human rights. 6 The inclusive and pluralistic nature of associational groups promotes what is seen as the "emerging right to democratic governance. ,,27 Some viview the very existence of a robust civil
society as a precondition to democratic governance and to the realization of human rights.28 On the other hand, transnational civil society may undermine this norm of democratic governance since voluntary associations are wholly unaccountable to any sovereign and,
thus, may act in a manner contrary to democratic principles. This article examines this paradox by analyzing the ways in which nonState participants may work in conjunction with States to promote
these norms.
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary
Associations and Democratic Governance, in I ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY:
THE REAL UTOPIAS PROJECT 1, 7 (Erik 0. Wright ed., 1995). But see, e.g.,
MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

(1982) (underscoring the dif-

ficulties and contradictions associated with collective action).
24. See, e.g., Philip Oxhom, From ControlledInclusion to Coerced Marginalization: The Struggle for Civil Society in Latin America, in CIVIL SOCIETY:
THEORY, HISTORY, COMPARISON 250, 252 (John A. Hall ed., 1995). But see
ZBIGNIEW RAU, THE REEMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND

THE SOVIET UNION 43 (1991) (describing civil societies as arenas of resistance to a

totalitarian State).
25. See RAU, supra note 24, at 98.
26. See, e.g., P~rez-Diaz, supra note 3.
27. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) (discussing the emergence of democracy as
a global normative entitlement); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to PoliticalParticipation in InternationalLaw, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992) (discussing enfranchisement of participants in international law).
28. See GELLNER, supra note 16, at 188. See also COHEN & ARATO, supra note
5, at 80 (identifying civil society as a "locus of democratization").
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First, this article outlines the transformations pertaining to space,
namely, globalization and the roles of State and non-State participants. A discussion of these changes reveals the increasing importance of transnational civil societies. Second, this article analyzes
transformations pertaining to methodology and idea, analyzing the
concepts of "governance" and the right to "democratic governance."
This article also examines the change in focus from government to
governance and explains the connection of these concepts to the
promotion of human rights. Finally, this article details the role of
non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") in transnational civil societies, and explains how their actions may run contrary to democratic norms, and how their participation in transnational civil societies can improve. A discussion of the effects of NGOs on "legal
transplants"29 in Central and Eastern Europe illustrates the problems
of NGOs attempting to foster positive social change. Ultimately, this
discussion provides insight into the evolution of the system of international human rights law and practice and the challenges that lie
ahead.

I. TRANSFORMED SPACE: GLOBALIZATION AND
THE ROLES OF STATE AND NON-STATE

PARTICIPANTS
The rise of non-State participants and networks is a product of the
complex phenomenon known as globalization. Richard Falk has
drawn a distinction between globalization from above and globalization from below to identify "two interrelated tendencies: the restructuring of the world economy on a regional and global scale through
the agency of the transnational corporation and financial markets
from above, and the rise of transnational social forces concerned
with environmental protection, human rights, and peace and human
security from below."30 The impact of globalization from below is

29. See infra notes 225-235 and accompanying text.
30. Richard Falk, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the New Jurisprudence of Global Civil Society, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 333, 335

(1997) [hereinafter Falk, New Jurisprudence of Global Civil Society]; see also
Richard Falk, The Right to Self-Determination Under InternationalLaw: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Icoherence of Experience, in SELFDETERMINATION AND SELF-ADMINISTRATION: A SOURCEBOOK 47, 50-51 (Wolf-
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created by transnational civil societies, "the thin and uneven public
sphere that can coalesce at the global level where individuals interact
for common purposes and shape collective life."'" Additionally,
globalization represents four interrelated and seemingly contradictory dimensions.
First, globalization recognizes an increasing interdependence at
the world level, where the activities of people in a specific area have
repercussions that go beyond local, regional, or national borders."
For instance, human rights problems in an interdependent world increasingly cross State borders.34 Similarly, products that present environmental hazards endanger the health of people in numerous
States. 5 This interdependence of markets causes reverberating crossborder explosions when markets go bad, subsequently resulting in
mass migration and widespread threats to economic and social rights.
Therefore, in order to remedy these situations, human rights advocates must find new ways to gather information and conduct transborder advocacy.

gang Danspeckgruber ed., 1997) [hereinafter Falk, The Right to Self-Determination
Under InternationalLaw].
31. Price, supra note 11, at 627.
32. See Zdravko Mlinar, Individuation and Globalization: The Transformation
of Territories Social Organization, in GLOBALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL
IDENTITIES 15, 20-22 (Zdravko Mliner ed., 1992) (listing dimensions of globalization).
33. See TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 42 (Robert 0.
Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 1972) (noting the growing interdependence
among industrialized nations and subsequent changes in decision making).
34. See id. (discussing early articulations of the interdependence theory).
35. See Alexandre Kiss, The InternationalProtection of the Environment, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC & CONTEMPORARY READINGS 391, 393 (Charlotte
Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) (emphasizing need for international environmental
law); Edith Brown Weiss, Planetary Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: ISSUES & ACTION 187, 191 (Richard Claude & Burns Weston eds.,
1992) (listing various environmental activities that inhibit planetary rights); PrezDiaz, supra note 3, at 90 (affirming need to establish an international public
authority to implement international legislation for dealing with such issues as the
environment and human rights). See generally Hugh J. Marbury, Hazardous Waste
Exportation: The Global Manifestation of Environmental Racism, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 251, 260 (1995) (discussing global effects of transporting hazardous wastes).
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Second, globalization results in the fragmentation of States and
peoples into autonomous groups and areas. Consequently, as a survival tactic in the increasingly interconnected world, economic, social, and cultural networks form to promote their own collective interests. 36 These associations usually form around common identity
markers, such as language, culture, and kinship." Identity groups
also make new demands for their own rights to culture, language,
and association. Unfortunately, the formation of identity groups
may, by design or as an unintentional byproduct, threaten the human
rights of other identity groups. For example, the formation of ethnic
Hungarian groups in Romania may be perceived as threatening by
ethnic Romanians.39 While the markers chosen by identity groups
cross State boundaries, they nonetheless remain within a demarcated
territory or population-e.g., Romania or the community of Romanians. 4° The rise of the identity groups is considered as fragmentary because it emphasizes the division of an imagined larger identity-e.g.,
the people of Romania-into smaller pieces-e.g., ethnic Romanian
versus all other minority ethnicity. As a result, human rights advocates become concerned with protecting and promoting the human
rights of ethno-national minorities.4 When tensions between identity
36. See, e.g., Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration:
FragmentedStates and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &

Bus. 1014, 1045 (1996-7) (emphasizing need for greater international coordinating); DAVID KNOKE, POLITICAL NETWORKS: THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE 76-81
(1990) (exemplifying black civil rights movement to illustrate organizations that
attempt to achieve their own goals).
37. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Indigenous Peoples, in International
Law: A ConstructivistApproach to The Asian Controversy 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414
(1998); MUSLIM IDENTITY AND THE BALKAN STATE 4 (Hugh Poulton & Suha Taji-

Tarouki eds., 1997).
38. See David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, A Movement Society: Contentious
Politicsfor a New Century, in THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT SOCIETY: CONTENTIOUS
POLITICS FOR A NEW CENTURY 1, 18 (David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow eds.,

1998).
39. See KATHERINE VERDERY, WHAT WAS SOCIALISM, AND WHAT COMES
NEXT? 115-26 (1996) (discussing importance of this kind of fragmentation for
construction of civil society in Romania).
40. See generally TONE BRIGA, BEING MUSLIM THE BOSNIAN WAY: IDENTITY
AND COMMUNITY IN A CENTRAL BOSNIAN VILLAGE (1995) (describing Muslim
identity in Bosnia and providing another good illustration of this phenomenon).
41. See, e.g., HELSINKI WATCH, SINCE THE REVOLUTION: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
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groups are further manipulated by local power brokers,42 the situation
may erupt into an intrastate conflict, raising a whole host of human
rights concerns. In the words of John Keane, a combative, pluralistic civil society may "hemorrhage to death.""
Third, globalization somewhat results in the homogenization of
the world' wherein "instead of differences among territorial units
which were mutually exclusive, there is now a uniformity.' , 46 This
process of unification has two branches. The first, which has tremendous implications for human rights advocates, was described as "a
growing element of global consciousness in the way the members of
global civil society act. ' 47 Participants in civil societies are progressively agreeing on such norms as diplomatic languages and systems
of representation and democratic governance.49 The domination of
liberal norms in international politics dislocates the anarchical social
construction of the world and enables emerging social construction
based on a more cooperative, problem-solving civil society.

ROMANIA (1991).

42. See generally

JULIE MERTUS,

Kosovo: How

MYTHS

AND TRUTHS

STARTED A WAR (1999).

43. See generally Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities, Nationalitiesand Ethnic Conflict, in CHESTER A. CROCKER ET AL., MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES AND
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 53 (1996) (exemplifying genocidal
campaign against Kurds as result of Iran-Iraq war); KUMAR RUPESINGHE, ETHNIC
CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1988); CYNTHIA H. ENLOE, ETHNIC CONFLICT
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1986); ALEXANDRA STIGLMAYER, MASS RAPE:

THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 82, 85 (1993) (providing

discussion of gender-based implications of ethnic conflict).
44. See Roninger, supra note 20, at 7.
45. See Kingsbury, supra note 37, at 421 (commenting on some common elements shared by indigenous people). See also Ileana M. Porras, A Latcrit Sensibility Approaches the International: Reflections on Environmental Rights as Third
Generation Solidarity Rights, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 413, 424 (1997)
(arguing for a reassessment of the implications of globalism).
46. Mlinar, supra note 32, at 21 (emphasis added).
47. Lipschutz, supra note 10, at 399.

48. See Albert Bergesen, Turning World System Theory on Its head, in GLOBAL
CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY 76 (Mike Feather-

stone ed., 1990).
49. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.

50. See Lipshutz, supra note 10, at 407.
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The second branch of unification, which has limited utility for
human rights advocates, is the so-called "McDonaldization" of the
world." This form of outside, consumer-oriented homogenization
does not necessarily minimize the competing cultural perspectives
that threaten "to diminish the prospects for developing truly universal standards of human rights and more effective mechanisms for
achieving them."52 On the contrary, forced impositions of outside
ideas on local matters may result in retrenchment and reactive nationalism that can lead to human rights disaster for minority groups.
Applying the broader trend toward trans-border connections, new reactive nationalism may become "transnationalism" if connected to
politicized national entities located in more than one territory." Furthermore, the view of globalization as homogenization minimizes the
complex way in that the local interacts with the international." Much
of what is described as "local culture" as opposed to "outside ideas"
is in fact already a reflection of the global. Conversely, the "local"
influences, and is reflected in, the global."' Aggressive forms of contemporary nationalism are made within global terms of identity and
shaped by local particularities.16 It is essential that human rights advocates are sensitive to the local conditions that give rise to human

51. See generally BARBER, supra note 13.
52. Abdulahi A. An-Na'im, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 1, 1 (Abdulahi A. An-Na'im
ed., 1992).
53. See Luis Eduardo Guarnizo & Michael Peter Smith, The Location of
Transnationalisn, in TRANSNATIONALISM FROM BELOW 3, 11 (Luis Eduardo

Guarnizo & Michael Peter Smith eds., 1998).
54. See Arijun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural
Economy, in GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY

295, 304 (Michael Featherstone ed., 1990) (discussing complexity of globalization
and the international implications stemming form ideas of nationhood).
55. Roland Robertson calls this phenomenon "glocalization." See Roland Robertson, Glocalization: Time-Space and Honmogeneity-Heterogeneity, in GLOBAL

MODERNITIES 25, 26 (Mike Featherstone et. al. eds., 1995). See generally SAKIA
SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOUR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT AND LABOUR FLOW (1988).

56. See generally Janice Gross Stein, Image, Identity, and Conflict Resolution,
in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL

CONFLICT 93, 95 (Chester A. Crocker et. al. eds., 1996) (discussing creation of enemy identities).
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rights abuses and the ways in which local societies adapt and apply
human rights norms.57
A fourth phenomenon of globalization also undercuts homogeneity by producing diversification within territorial communities. As
Marshall Berman explains:
Modem environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology: in
this sense, modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish."8

The easing of border controls in previously restrictive States results in an inward flow of goods, information, ideas, and people-including people with new and challenging ideas on human rights. Exposure to outside beliefs increases the variety of ideas in local
spaces. With restrictions on travel relaxed, "[p]eople travel to teach,
to learn, to buy, to sell, to kill and to heal. In doing so, they learn
new ways of doing things, including new forms of social organization, and they come to see the costs of old ways of doing things." 9
This can have a positive impact for human rights as it may result in
increased willingness to accept human rights norms within a local
context. At the same time, new human rights concerns may arise
where local power structures perceive a threat and fortify themselves
against outside influences. In short, a politics of collective identity
and participation is emerging amidst diversification and "[in] some
places such politics are expressed via nationalism; in others through
identities based on civil society."'

57. See, e.g., Stephen P. Marks, Human Rights Education in U.N. Peace
Building: From Theory to Practice, in HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 35 (George J. Andreopolous & Richard Pierre Claude
eds., 1997) (detailing a United Nations effort to improve human rights norms in
Cambodia through education of the Cambodian people, government, and NGOs).
58. MARSHALL

BERMAN,

ALL

THAT

EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY 15 (1982).

59. Lipschutz, supra note 10, at 413.
60. Id. at 398.
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Where is the State in this new global geography? Some commentators would like to dispense with the State as the principle unit of
analysis in international relations and international law.6 Ken Booth
exemplifies this thinking when he warns:
Sovereignty is disintegrating. States are less able to perform their traditional functions. Global factors increasingly impinge on all decision made
by governments. Identity patterns are becoming more complex, as people
assert their local loyalties but want to share in global values and lifestyles.... The [metaphor for the] international system which is now developing ... is of an egg-box containing the shells
of sovereignty; but
62
alongside it a global community omelet is cooking.

Although the global omelet exists, the move away from the State
should not be overstated. The State still is active in human rights
norm formation and enforcement and interstate activities pertaining
to human rights issues still hold great importance.63 Only the shape,
direction, nature and scope of interstate politics have changed. ' All
of these changes have an impact on the ways in which human rights
problems are handled and how the progressive realization of international human rights is approached.
The global omelet includes numerous non-State actors, some of
which are partially the creation of States, some of which are wholly
independent. As Benedict Kingsbury has noted, the State is now operating within an increasingly dense matrix of transnational interactions involving other States, inter-governmental institutions, corporations, and a whole range of cross-border groups and networks that

61. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JiM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?:
THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992); KENICHI
OHMAE,

THE

BORDERLESS

WORLD:

POWER

AND

STRATEGY

IN THE

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (1990) (emphasizing that in a globalized world, consumption, not State sovereignty, is key).
62. Ken Booth, Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism, in Theory and Practice,
67 INT'LAFF. 530, 542 (1991).
63. See generally EVAN LUARD, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POLITICS: THE
CHANGED Focus OF POLITICAL ACTION IN THE MODERN WORLD (1990).

64. See, e.g., John G. Ruggie, International Structure and International
Transformation: Time, Space and Method, in GLOBAL CHANGES AND
THEORETICAL CHANGES 21 (Ernst-Otto Czempiel & James N. Rosenau eds., 1989)
(discussing international structural theory).
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are slowly evolving into a transnational civil society. 6 Participants in
the human rights decision-making process include not only individual States but also individual participants, NGOs, intergovernmental
organizations ("IGOs"), and other voluntary associational groups. 6
This means that the formulation and implementation of human rights
standards now involves more than the State; they involve many nonState interests as well.67
The direction of interstate interaction was altered by an increased
emphasis on cross-boundary linkages. For example, non-State actors
in State A may interact directly with State and non-State actors in
States B and C regardless of the attitude of State A, or whether or not
State A actually has relationships with States B and C. In the past, the
most important decisions were made with States directly connecting
with other States on a one-to-one basis. Today, non-State participants
interact directly with each other and with States. In this sense, it is
possible to characterize them as "sovereignty free" actors. 68 Their
lines of communication may "cross" in unusual and unexpected
ways. 69
The direction of interstate interaction was further altered by an increasing growth of international and regional networks operating at
the sub-State level.7° Importantly, there was a rise in direct contacts
65. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of
Competing Conceptions of InternationalLaw, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 357
(1994) (discussing new "liberal" theories of international law).
66. See generally HENRY J. STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS: NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991)
(providing an overview of non-governmental organizations with respect to the human rights movement).
67. See Spanier, supra note 2, at 43-46 (stating that international organizations
may be comprised of representatives of States and, thus, their "non-State" nature
may be of a different quality than that of non-governmental organizations).
68. See JAMES N. ROSENAU, TURBULENCE INWORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 36 (1990) (providing examples of "sovereign free" actors as "multinational corporations, ethnic groups, bureaucratic agencies, political
parties, subnational governments, transnational societies [and] international organizations").
69. See Julie Mertus, The LiberalState and the National Soul, Soc. & LEGAL
THEORY (forthcoming 1999).
70. See generally RICHARD W. MANSBACH ET AL., THE WEB OF WORLD
POLITICS: NONSTATE ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 9 (1976) (providing wide

1999]

THE PROMISE OF TRANSNA TIONAL CIVIL SOCIEn'

1349

between national regulators with similar functional responsibilities,
such as between environmental regulatory groups in States A, B, and
C. Similarly, there was a rise in direct contacts between nongovernmental organizations with similar human rights concerns, such
as between women's human rights groups in States A, B, and C."
Technological changes were instrumental in promoting the kinds
of cross-boundary linkages that foster burgeoning transnational social movements. Today, many participants in transnational civil society depend on public communication and discourse. In addition, the
realms of public communication and discourse are also a site of
transnational civil society.' 2 Internet user groups, bulletin boards, and
websites have constructed a new arena wherein political and social
norms are proposed, debated, and determined.' Communication on
the Internet creates a community of informed activists who are unbounded by hierarchy or territory-anyone, anywhere can be an activist on the Internet. As Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss note,
"[e]lectronic means have literally made it possible to ignore borders
and to create the kinds of communities based on common values and
objectives that were once almost the exclusive prerogative of nationalism."74
range of historical developments).
71. See generally MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIvISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (describing
emergence of transnational advocacy networks in international politics); Kathryn
Siklink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks and Sovereignty in Latin
America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993) (describing these organizations as being linked

by shared values or principled ideas).
72. See generally JOHN KEANE, THE MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY (1991) (ad-

dressing role of media in civil society).
73. See RONALD J. DEIBERT, PARCHMENT,

PRINTING,

AND HYPERMEDIA:

COMMUNICATION IN WORLD ORDER TRANSFORMATION 159-63 (1997) (discussing

transnational social movements in hypermedia environment). See generally Jennifer Myers, Human Rights and Development: Using Advanced Technology to Promote Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 343
(1998) (examining recent technological advancements that have accelerated global
economic and social development).
74. Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralising Global Governance:
Analytical Approaches and Dimensions, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 357, 365 (1995).
See, e.g., Mark Thieroff & Edward A. Amley, Jr., Proceedingto Justice and Ac-

countability in the Balkans: The hIternational Criminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 231, 235 (1998).
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The reaction of transnational participants to the war in BosniaHerzegovina illustrates the mobilization of transnational civil society
in response to human rights and humanitarian crises. A global network of State and non-State participants watched the crises develop;
slowly, they decided whether to take action. The network included
transnational professionalized bodies designed to manage, control
and respond to such crises, such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE") and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"). Media and information sources, including the
Internet, publicized information about human rights abuses and humanitarian conditions, drawing attention to the widespread use of
rape as a strategic weapon of war and to the deliberate targeting of
civilian groups based on their ethno-national background. NGOs
monitored abuses and suggested action to professionalized international bodies, including the State-based Helsinki Committees and
Amnesty International, as well as trans-State and sub-State service
organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees ("UNHCR"), the Croatian Red Cross, or Save the Children.
Also, NGOs successfully pushed for the issuance of various United
Nations Security Council resolutions authorizing various forms of
humanitarian and/or military intervention and for the establishment
of international war crimes tribunals. States were involved in this response, both as members or supporters of the various types of bodies
named above, and as actors responding in their own names. The
States that were most effective in addressing human rights questions
were the ones that adjusted to the shifting global landscape and, in
particular, worked constructively with a range of non-State participants.75
This simplified rendition of the actors responding to the crisis in
the former Yugoslavia serves to illustrate the changing role of the
State and the importance of non-State actors. A primary lesson of the
new global geography is that transnational civil society has become
an increasingly important space in which human rights norms may be
given the force of law. Another key lesson, well illustrated by the
former Yugoslavia, is that State and non-State participants must
work together to promote and protect human rights. In doing so, the
75. In making this observation, the author draws from her two years in Yugoslavia during the war.
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methodologies and ideas they have at their disposal were transformed as well. This Article will now address this aspect of the new
global geography.

II. TRANSFORMED METHODOLOGIES AND
IDEAS: GOVERNANCE AND THE EMERGING
RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY
Within the new global geography, State and non-State participants
have at their disposal methodologies and ideas for addressing human
rights issues that were not at the forefront fifty years ago. This section examines the possibilities and limitations for one central set of
ideas and methodologies, namely, those related to governance and
the right to democracy. It begins by examining the scope and nature
of these concepts, examining both possibilities and limitations, and
then redirections for the application of the concepts in line with human rights norms.
A. NATURE AND SCOPE OF GOVERNANCE AND THE RIGHT TO
DEMOCRACY

The rise of non-State actors and the changed role of the State are
intertwined with a move from "government" to "governance." There
is now a shift from the building of international organizations that
generate and administer rules-e.g., a "world" government'--to
governing relationships that transcend national frontiers without sovereign authority. James Rosenau distinguishes governance from government as follows:
[G]overmment suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by
police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies,
whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may
or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and
that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and
attain compliance.... [Governance] embraces governmental institutions,
but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby

76. See COMMON RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 1990s: THE STOCKHOL\ INITIATIVE
ON GLOBAL SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE 35-42 (1991) (discussing a reformist call
for global governance that still embodies an institutional focus).

1352

AM. U. INTL L. REV.

[14:1335

those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy
77
their needs, and fulfill their wants.

Achieving governance thus necessitates more complex and far
reaching methods than the mere establishment of government.
Establishing a distinction between "good" and "bad" governance
can extend this vision. According to the World Bank:
Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened
policy making, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos acting in
furtherance of the public good, the rule of law, transparent processes, and
a strong civil society participating in public affairs. Poor governance is
characterized by arbitrary policy making, unaccountable bureaucracies,
unenforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of executive power, a civil
society unengaged in public life, and widespread corruption. 8

Another descriptive term for "good governance" is "democratic
governance." More often, however, the term "democratic governance" is used to invoke an electoral focus.79 In other words, the "legitimization of government authority" using a "mechanism of periodic competitive elections," supported by "civil rights and liberties"

77. James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order and Change in World Politics, in
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS

1, 4 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
78. Patricia Armstrong, Human Rights and Multilateral Development Banks:
Governance Concerns in Decision Making, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 271, 280
(1994) (citing WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE 1
(OPERATIONS POLICY DEPARTMENT, FINAL DRAFT) (Nov. 23, 1993)); see William
Chia, Quality of Government Outweighs PoliticalSystem: Prof.Koh, Bus. TIMES,

Apr. 29, 1993, at 2 (presenting the view of Professor Tommy Koh of Singapore
that economic development occurs largely because of governance skills and not
because of a country's political structure); see also Bill Maurer, CyberspatialSovereignties:Offshore Finance,Digital Cash, and the Limits of Liberalism, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 493, 497 (1998) (presenting differing views of the State by
"liberals" and "realists"). The author critiques the World Bank's inconsistency in
applying this norm of "good governance" and its inability to apply the norm itself.
See Julie Mertus, Doing Democracy Differently, in THIRD WORLD STUDIES (Diane
Otto guest ed., forthcoming 1999).

79. See, e.g., Ibrahim J. Gassama, Safeguarding the Democratic Entitlement: A
Proposalfor United Nations Involvement in National Politics,30 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 287, 293-94 (1997) (arguing that a United Nations policy of democratic
guardianship would bring added attention to human rights abuses).
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as well as a "constitutional order dedicated to the rule of law."' The
"rule of law" in this context differs substantially from "rule by law."
Neil Kritz draws out the distinction as follows:
[T]he rule of law does not simply provide yet one more vehicle by which
government can wield and abuse its awesome power; to the contrary, it
establishes principles that constrain the power of government, oblige it to
conduct itself according to a series of prescribed and publicly known
rules.... Adherence to the rule of law entails far more than the mechanical application of static legal technicalities; it involves an evolutionary
search for those institutions and processes that will best facilitate authentic stability through justice. 8'

Institution building in the name of fostering the rule of law includes
such tactics as programs for improving the competency and independence of the judiciary, designing curricula for the building of a
professional and human-rights respecting police force, improving legal education for the preparation of new legal practitioners in a
democratic system, and the creation of mechanisms to secure the independence of the bar.82
NGOs have actively promoted the establishment of institutions
that foster good governance. For instance, some environmental activists have argued in favor of good environmental governance, "
while at the same time not pushing for the creation of a uniform gov-

80. Implementing Democratization: What Role for International Organizations?, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 356, 372 (1997) (panel discussion remarks of
Susan Marks) (discussing role of international organizations in relation to democratization).
81. Neil J. Kritz, The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase: Building a Stable
Peace, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 587, 588 (Chester A. Crocker et. al. eds., 1996).
82. See id. at 590-92 (discussing the emerging international standards that define the "rule of law").
83. See ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 140-60 (1994) (discussing effectiveness
of international governance systems); see also Lyuba Zarsky, The Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation Forum and the Environment: Regional Environmental
Governance in the Age of Economic Globalization, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 323, 347 (1997) (discussing environmental governance approach taken by
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum).
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ernment on the environment.: Good environmental governance
would reflect such values as transparency, accountability, and accessibility in a "more or less formalized bundle of rules, roles, and relationships that define the social practice of states and non-state actors
interacting in various issue areas [such as the environment], rather
than formal interstate organizations with budgets and buildings and
authority to apply rules and impose sanctions."85 Good governance in
the environmental arena need not promote uniformity. On the contrary, it may leave room for the existence of diverse networks addressing specific issues organized around concepts of geography,
nationality, and culture. 6
As it has evolved from idea into practice, governance has come to
embrace two distinct components. The first component is characterized by an increase in the delegation of public functions to particularized bodies operating on the basis of professional technique and
with stated goals of greater transparency, accountability, and more
inclusive participation. 7 Environmental regulatory bodies, formed on
either an interstate or sub-State level, provide one illustration of
groups composed of professionals who open their day-to-day policy
deliberations and operations to public comment and scrutiny." The
84. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Stepping up to the Global Environment Challenge, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 103 (1996) (stating that without an overarching
sovereign to respond to cross-jurisdictional pollution, optimal solutions to environmental concerns are unlikely to be met).
85. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativisin
and InternationalGovernance, 197 UTAH L. REV. 545, 549 n.4 (1997) (adding that
"governance has emerged as a distinctive international motto and is consciously
distinguished from 'government'). See also Benedict Kingsbury, The TunaDolphin Controversy, the World Trade Organization, and the Liberal Project to
Reconceptualize InternationalLaw, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL L. 1, 27-28 (1994).
86. See GARETH PORTER & JANET WELSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 15-33 (1991) (exploring the diversity of issues and tactics in the environmental arena).
87. Ronnie Lipschutz has used the term "heteronomous" to describe these actors: "[they] are differentiated from each other in terms of specialisations: there is
not a single network, but many, each fulfilling a different function." Lipschutz, supra note 10, at 391 n.9.
88. See generally Ken Conca, Greening the UN: Environmental Organizations
and the UN System, in NGOS, THE UN & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 105 (Thomas G.
Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996); THE STATE AND SOCIAL POWER IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Ken Cocca eds., 1993) (as-
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second component is characterized by an increasing growth of nongovernmental norm-promoting and norm-monitoring organizations,
and reflects a reaction to the danger posed by the delegation of public
functions to particularized bodies that may not easily be held accountable. 9 Operating on both transnational and sub-State levels,
these NGOs act as "watch" organizations and push for the realization
of human rights normsY
In addition to regulating who gets what, when, and how, governance has a constitutive function.9' In this sense, global governance is
conceptualized as multiple and overlapping processes of decision for
defining and distributing authority and power worldwide., Global
governance structures our world by determining what constitutes
relevant political behavior and which dimensions of collective life
are most significant. By creating the very terrain in which authority
and power are exercised, the constitutive function of governance has
great importance for States and non-State participants who try to ex-

sembling a series of essays concerning global environmental politics); Harold K.

Jacobson & Edith Brown-Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with InternationalEnvironmental Accords: PreliminaryObservations From a CollaborativeProject, I
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119 (1995); Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: EnvironmentalActivism and World Civic Politics,47 WORLD POL. 311 (1995).

89. See generally THOMAS PRINCEN & MATTHIAS FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL
NGOS IN WORLD POLITICS: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL 218 (1994)
(discussing the role of international environmental NGOs); JULIE FISHER, THE
ROAD FROM RIO: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL

(discussing emergence of nongovernmental organizations as factors in the implementation of sustainable development).
90. See generally Felice D. Gaer, Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN, in NGOS, THE UN & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51
(Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996) (discussing the most visible
groups, which are Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International League for Human Rights). There has been, however, a proliferation of human rights NGOs since the 1970s. See generally id.
91. See Keith Krause, Address at the 1997 ACUNS/ASIL Meeting on Global
Governance at Brown University (July 29, 1997).
92. See PHILLIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 210
(1990) (explaining the constitutive nature of this kind of power as "a power over
consciousness itself, through its control of society's reality-forming, as well as the
power to embody the values derived from such reality-forming in legal relations
and to interpret and apply those legal relationships authoritatively.").
MOVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (1993)
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ert some influence or control over human rights issues.93 It is the constitutive function of "governance" that provides a source and marker
for the legitimacy of State governments and international organizations.94 Legitimacy is central to the enforcement of human rights."
Only human rights processes and bodies perceived as legitimate are
taken seriously; only States perceived as legitimate can enforce human rights norms successfully.96
A key idea arising out of the connection between legitimacy and
governance is the right to democratic governance, an emerging right
that finds its grounding in the words of Article 21 of the Universal
Declaration: "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government." 97 As Thomas Franck argues, "the radical vision [that
governments should rule with the consent of the governed and that
those governments that act in such a manner will be perceived as legitimate] is rapidly becoming, in our time, a normative rule of the
international system."98 Franck terms this right as one of "democratic
governance" or a "democratic entitlement," and its supporters variously argue that this vision of democracy is essential for the legitimacy of States, for peace, and for the enforcement of human rights."9

93. See Franck, supra note 27, at 50-52.
94. See id. at 50 (discussing the constitutive function of governance and noting
"[1]egitimacy ... is the quality of the rule, or a system of rules, or a process for
making or interpreting rules that pulls both the rule makers and those addressed by
the rules towards voluntary compliance"). See also David Caron, Governance and
Collective Legitimization in the New World Order, 6 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 29
(1993) (considering fundamental principles of governance). See generally THOMAS
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995) [hereinafter FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW]; THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS

(1990).

95. See Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 53, 81-84 (1992) (asserting the notion that human rights protections are elementary to the legitimacy of States).
96. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in ContemporaryInternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 867 (1990).
97. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 21.
98. Franck, supra note 27, at 46.

99. See generally DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael E. Brown et.
al. eds., 1996) (presenting both sides of the "democratic peace" argument);
IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE

107-39 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983) (pre-

dicting that democracies are not prone to aggression). But see generally Edward D.
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Although the elements of the right to democratic governance are
not clearly defined, they appear to encompass both procedural and
participation-oriented theories about what constitutes the rule of law
in a democracy.'00 The 1990 Copenhagen Document of the OSCEthen "CSCE"o'0 -underscores the importance of the rule of law for
the operation of just societies, declaring that "societies based.., on
the rule of law are prerequisites for.. . the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and cooperation."' 02 The OSCE also recognizes the
underlying substantive nature of rule of law institutions:
[T]he rule of law does not mean merely a formal legality which assures
regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the
supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions
providing a framework for its fullest expression.'O'

The OSCE includes in its requirements for the rule of law the following: the duty of government to act in compliance with the constitution and the law, accountability of the military and the police to
civilian authorities, consideration and adoption of legislation by
public procedure, publication of administrative regulations as the
condition for their validity, effective means of redress against administrative decisions and the provision of information to the
person
affected on the remedies available, an independent judiciary, protec-

Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratizationand War, 74 FOREIGN AFF., May/June
1995, at 79 (arguing that as democratic States evolve, wars erupt that involve these
democracies).
100. See COHEN & ARATO, supra note 5, at 4-8; see also John Norton Moore,
The Rule of Law andForeignPolicy, 2 HARv. J. WORLD AFF. 92 (1993).
101. The name of the organization changed from the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe in 1974, reflecting its move from a series of periodic meetings with a loose
institutional structure to a more permanent organization with a more defined
structure. See generally Peter Leuprecht, Innovation in the European System of
Human Rights Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement?, 8
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 313 (1998) (providing complete historical
background).
102. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1307 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document].
103. Id. para. 2, at 1307.
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tion of the independence of legal practitioners, and detailed guarantees in the area of criminal procedure." °
A related component of the right to democratic governance, which
is specifically more process-oriented, concerns the electoral process.
One wave of collective democratic institution-building focusing on
elections began with United Nations supervision of elections in Namibia upon its independence in 1989.05 The 1990 Paris Charter of
the OSCE illustrates this focus, recognizing the right of every individual, without discrimination, "to participate in free and fair elections.' ' 6 The Copenhagen Document of the OSCE spells out the substantive elements of the "right to elections," stating "free
elections... will be held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot or
by equivalent free voting procedure, under conditions which ensure
in practice the free expression of the opinion of the electors in the
choice of their representatives.' 0 7
Another process-based component of the right to democratic governance is the bundle of rights that help to ensure free and open elections, such as association 8 and speech rights.' °9 Participationoriented theorists value these rights as they enable more individuals
and groups to take part in political life." Democratic civil society
104. See id. paras. 5.3, 5.6, 5.8, 5.10-5.12, 5.14-5.19, at 1308-09; see also Kritz,
supra note 81, at 590.
105. See Karl J. Irving, The United Nations and Democratic Intervention: Is
'Swords Into Ballot Boxes'Enough?, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 41, 42 (1996).
106. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a
New Europe and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of
the Charter, No. 21, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190, 194 (1991). See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
107. Copenhagen Document, supra note 102, para. 5.1, at 1308.
108. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY

VERSUS CONTROL 10-11 (1982) (identifying seven "ideal democratic criteria,"
some of which exist in modem democratic regimes).
109. See Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contradictionsof Mainstream
ConstitutionalTheory, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1683, 1700 (1998) (determining whether
free speech exists as a democratic non controversial precondition to democratic
governance in terms of whether people actually have the ability to meaningfully
express themselves on political issues affecting the polity).
110. See, e.g., Julie A. Mertus, Beyond the Solitary Self. Voice, Community, and
Reproductive Freedom, 3 COLUM. J. GEN. & L. 247 (1992) (discussing "enabling
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"fosters the citizenship skills and opportunities required for the explicit assertion of popular sovereignty over the apparatus of the representative democratic state.""' It is through participation in voluntary associations that individuals can gain the political
competency
2
agendas."
political
influence
to
and skills needed
Process-oriented theorists argue for recognition and enforcement
of an independent norm of participation. As Eric Dannenmaier observes:
A true democracy... must... feature transparent and participatory decision-making and a government that is in constant dialogue with its citizens to shape and direct fundamental policies. It is pluralistic decisionmaking that is at the heart of democracy....n'

The provisions of the Universal Declaration and its progeny can be
read as "embody[ing] rights of free and equal participation in governance."" 4 In conjunction with recognizing the importance of fair
and open elections, the OSCE has recognized "the importance of pluralism with regard to political organizations.""$
In any event, whether conceived as a right unto itself or as a bundle of rights, the notion of democratic entitlement has at its core one
coherent purpose: to create the opportunity for all persons to assume
responsibility for shaping the kind of world in which they live and
work.11 6 In practice, governance norms reflect values such as change
and progress over tradition, growth over distribution, and so forth.'"
These values establish the parameters of our choices as individuals
and as members of communities.

rights" essential for participation in society).
111. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283, 343 (1996).
112. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 23; see also Michael Walzer, The Civil Soci-

ety Argument, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 153, 168 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995).
113. Eric Dannenmaier, Democracy in Development: Toward a Legal Frame-

workfor the Americas, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (1997).
114. Franck, supra note 27, at 79.
115. Copenhagen Document, supra note 102, para. 3, at 1308.

116. See Franck, supra note 27, at 79.
117. See Krause, supra note 91.
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All participants in international human rights discourse-weak
States, strong States, and non-State participants-have had to answer
to these ideas of governance and democratic entitlement." 8 Small and
weak States in particular are said to have much to gain from the right
to democratic governance. Ideally, norms of democratic participation
provide an important role for small and weak States so that they can
participate in international society on their own terms, cooperate with
each other, and in doing so, modify the conflictual role of socially
constructed anarchy.119 Democratic rights are also said to facilitate
order in "anarchical societies"'"2 by providing legal norms and
mechanisms that prevent powerful States from forcing less powerful
States to acquiesce with their interests and values.'2 ' Rules about
democratic participation in transnational civil society, however, are
intended to apply to strong as well as weak States. For strong States
there exist at least four types of incentives to adhere to norms of
democratic governance. 22 First and foremost, the substance of such
norms may benefit both strong and weak States, and thus adherence
to such norms may serve all States self-interest. Second, following
norms of participation may cause a State to avoid transaction costs,
reducing the costs of doing business. Third, acquiescing to participatory rules, even if the State does not benefit from those rules, can
facilitate international agreements concerning other issues, such as
trade, security, and the environment.2 2 Finally, assuming that democratic norms have the force of law, the States that comply can avoid

118. See, e.g., JOEL S. MIGDAL, STRONG SOCIETIES & WEAK STATES: STATESOCIETY RELATIONS AND STATE CAPACITY INTHE THIRD WORLD (1988).
119. See, e.g., BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR: AN AGENDA FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES INTHE POST-COLD WAR ERA (2d. ed. 1991).
120. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF
WORLD ORDER INPOLITICS (2d ed. 1977).
121. See Interview with Jack Donnelly in Hanoi, Vietnam (Apr. 9, 1998).
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, CSCE Human Dimension: The Birth of
System, in 1 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 1990, No.
2, at 163 (Andrew Clapham & Frank Emmert eds., 1992) (noting benefits derived
from adhering to or participating in various norms of democratic governance).
Buergenthal concludes that those States that participate in norms of democratic
governance are thereby able to "to condition their bilateral and multilateral relations in general upon progress in the human dimension sphere." Id. at 207.
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developing reputations as lawbreakers.' For all of these reasons,
"democratic governance" has become a force that State and nonState actors must reckon with as they participate in the global community.'
B. LIMITATIONS AND REDIRECTIONS

Despite the purported advantages for all participants adhering to
norms of democratic governance, the idea of global democratic governance is not yet fully defined and realized.' z6 Many commentators
critique the ways in which the right to democracy is implemented on
the State as well as the transnational level.IV Somewhat paradoxically Janet Lord notes, "it is by now characteristic for discussions
concerning the democratic entitlement to refer also to the democratic
deficit evident in some international institutions, the very ones which
are responsible for advancing democratic principles and for promoting the establishment of democracy within States."'2 As the former
Secretary-General of the United Nations has argued, "norms of
democratic participation should be extended to the international
arena."' 29 He added: "[I]f the international community encourages
democratic movements within States, it must also attempt to practice
democracy itself. Within the international system, all nations-large
and small, powerful and weak-should be able to make their voices
heard and to participate in decision-making."'"

124. See generally STEINER AND

ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUrMAN RIGHTS

(1996).
125. For a critique of inequities in the application of this norm of "democratic
governance, see Mertus, supra note 78.
126. See generally Franck, supra note 27, at 46 (recognizing that democracy is
on the way to becoming a global entitlement).
127. See, e.g., D.L. SHETH & AsHIs NANDY, THE MULTIVERSE OF DFMOCRACY:
ESSAYS IN HOUR OF RAjNI KOTHARI (1996).
128. Janet E. Lord, Due Process in the InternationalLegal Order: Beyond the
State-CenteredParadigm (undated paper for the U.S. Institute for Peace, on file

with author).
129. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative, 1
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 9 (1995).
130. Id.
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Problems are presented, however, as to how to accomplish international democratization. Exports of democratic governance could
backfire. Some observer's fear that the notion of democratic entitlement could "create new opportunities for Western imperialism"''
and "a continuation of humiliating intervention by States bent on
'civilizing' missions.' ' 2 Richard Falk has long seen great promise in
a new jurisprudence of transnational civil society, yet worries that
"liberal North American scholars have been, in effect, proclaiming
the universal applicability of the U.S. political and legal system, its
commitment to constitutionalism, electoral politics, and civil and
political rights."' 3 Falk suggests that serious questions arise as to
whether it is possible to transplant western-style, market-oriented
democracy to other countries and international institutions without
violating international human rights norms. "4 The idea of democracy
in international human rights law, as stated in the Declaration from
the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, is "based on the
freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political,
economic, social and cultural systems."' 35 Whenever States or nonState participants coerce weak governments to accept democratic
norms, such actions could run contrary to this notion of democracy.
Both the process of legal transplants by which politically strong
States such as the United States persuade weaker States to adopt
United States-style laws and institutions and the processes of international law-making, through which transnational bodies determine
131. Dianne Otto, Challenging the 'New World Order': International Law,
Global Democracy and the Possibilitiesfor Women, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 371, 383 (1993) (surveying implications of imposing protective
western democratic forms as a condition of State recognition in the international
arena).
132. Franck, supra note 27, at 80 (remarking that States with a long history of
"civilizing missions" may not take too kindly to pro-democracy imports).
133. See Falk, New Jurisprudenceof Global Civil Society, supra note 30, at 334
(describing ethnocentricity and lack of normative authority in the trend toward
democratization).
134. See generally Falk, The Right to Self-Determination Under International

Law, supra note 30 (examining the right to self-determination under international
law: the coherence of doctrine versus the incoherence of experience).
135. Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action, U.N. GAOR, World Conf.
on Hum. Rts., 48th Sess., pt. II, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/124, reprintedin
32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993) [hereinafterVienna Declaration].
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the content and impact of international law, run the danger of violating democratic norms."3 6 Weaker States may feel forced to adopt
United States-style laws. The process, however, by which those laws
are adopted may not be open to public scrutiny. For example, in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, American advisors have played an incredibly
forceful "behind the scenes" role in the formulation and adoption by
Bosnian entities of United States-style criminal and civil laws.'"" The
democratic norms of participation, accountability, and transparency
may be violated when smaller and politically marginalized voices are
kept out of the decision making process.'
Imposing democracy on States through outside force may unsuccessfully affect positive social change. "9 Human rights norms generally only work when they are internalized and not forced on a local
body politic by some outside power." One of the most basic lessons

136. See generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: U.S.
POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS (1993) (providing a case
study illustrating this phenomenon).
137. See, e.g., Draft Bosnian Criminal Law (June 1998) (on file with author)
(incorporating provisions from California law).
138. See, e.g., FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at
480-82. To use one illustration with respect to Bosnia, despite the good intentions
of foreign law experts, local women's groups are rarely consulted vith respect to
changes in criminal law. When they are approached for comments on criminal law,
local women's groups often find the tactics of the foreign experts to be inappropriate and alienating. Misreading of cultural cues compounds these difficulties. For
example, an American lawyer faxed women's groups draft provisions of the proposed criminal law pertaining to domestic violence. When no one responded from
the women's groups, the American lawyer assumed a lack of interest. In reality,
however, the women's groups were highly interested and extremely well informed
on the subject of domestic violence. They did not respond because they were offended by the American lawyer's failure to approach them in person. "He sent a
fax and expected us to respond immediately! Can you believe it!" one women exclaimed, "And we don't even know him!" In the United States, the faxing of messages to strangers and the expectation of immediate responses is the norm, but in
Bosnia a face-to-face meeting is required and, ideally, the stranger would make an
effort to visit the local office. See Interviews with NGOs, in Bosnia (June-July
1998) [hereinafterBosnian NGOs Interviews].
139. See Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Introduction: The Global Context of Democratization, 16 ALTERNATIVES 119, 120 (1991) (describing this phenomena as "democracy from above").
140. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
(Abdullahi An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990).
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of the foreign development world that is applicable to human rights
is that any transplants "must support domestically rooted processes
of change, not attempt to artificially reproduce pre-selected results. , 1 4' This corresponds with Franck's argument that States and
processes are unlikely to gain respect and affect compliance if they
are not viewed as legitimate 42 The same reasoning is applicable to
non-State entities; in particular, NGOs promoting democratic norms
are unlikely to gain local respect unless viewed as legitimate.
Does the above reasoning support abandoning the norms of democracy altogether? No, as long as the norm of democratic entitlement is refined to make it relevant to all societies and not merely as a
transplant of outside-e.g., western-values. 43 Dianne Otto suggests
a useful way to conceptualize the universality of human rights that
could avoid relativist paralysis. Human rights, she argues, should be
framed as "a dialogue, in the sense of struggle, rather than a civilizing mission."' In other words, the intersections between global ideas
of democracy and local practices and adaptations could be viewed as
a process of constant "transformative dialogue,"' 145 with neither universalism nor democracy being rejected but particularized. 46 The
values of democracy and its meaning for structuring relationships are
learned by paying attention "to the ongoing evolution of democratic
discourses' , 17 in civil society.
Otto's approach to human rights emphasizes both the relational as
well as constitutive aspects of human rights. Rights matter because

141. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr.
1998, at 95, 104 (examining foreign aid in the global picture).
142. See generally Franck, supra note 27, at 46 (examining notion of democracy
as validating governance).
143. Cf Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple, Order, Justice and the
UN: A Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 343 (1995) (attesting to the failure
of the European States to transplant their political ideologies to Africa).
144. Dianne Otto, Rethinking the Universality of Human Rights Law, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997).
145. Id. at 35.
146. See Chantal Mouffe, Radical Democracy: Modern or Postmodern?, in
UNIVERSAL ABANDON? THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERNISM

ed., 1988).
147. Otto, supra note 131, at 400.

31, 36 (Andrew Ross
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they define relationships. Also, the process of defining and enforcing
rights is done in the context of relationships. The process of rights
definition and enforcement demonstrates how power is distributed
and how relationships are regulated. Focusing on relationships makes
particular sense in a globalized world marked by an emerging transnational civil society where the varieties of relationships, the kinds of
actors, and the direction of dialogue are complex and changing. It
also makes sense in a world transformed by the idea of democratic
governance because these concepts have key relational and constitutive components. As explained below, a redirected application of
these concepts holds promise for transformed participation in human
rights processes.

Ill. TRANSFORMED PARTICIPATION IN HUMAN

RIGHTS DISCOURSE
The net result of the transformed political geography and the transformed ideas and methodology described above is the creation of
new opportunities and challenges for realizing human rights. The
shift from government to governance, and from a local to transnational civil society is well underway, driven and influenced by nonState actors, non-territorial social and economic forces, and the information technology revolution. The transformations do indeed
have the potential to be transformative for human rights advocates.
Full application of democratic norms in transnational civil society
could result in two sets of structural changes. First, it could open a
space for restructuring the international human rights system so that
the identity of the system itself is altered by democratic norms in a
manner receptive to human rights.'8 Second, through ethical engagement inthis process, human rights advocates themselves may
change as if forced to question "what kind of individuals [they]
would have to become in order to open ourselves to new worlds."'4'
In explaining the potential for positive social transformation, this
section uses as an illustration the work of human rights NGOs, even
148. See Otto, supra note 144, at 4.
149. DRUCILLA CORNELL, TRANSFOPMATIONS: RECOLLECTIVE IMAGINATION
AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 1 (1993); see also Otto, supra note 144, at 3-4 (employing this same definition of transformation in her examination of human rights
universals).
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though the lessons are also applicable to other actors participating in
transnational civil society. Some of the roles played and activities
undertaken by human rights NGOs in transnational civil society are
outlined, with an emphasis on NGOs engaged in "legal transplant"
projects. The section explains how NGOs may threaten democratic
norms even while their existence may promote democratic governance. Finally, the section suggests how NGOs could apply a refined
version of Franck's "democratic entitlement," which will improve
the ability of NGOs to realize the norms of the Universal Declaration.
A. THE POSITIVE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs

Transnational civil society is a highly political space for all participants, and human rights NGOs are no exception.'"0 As Burns
Weston noted, "[t]he debate about the nature and content of human
rights reflects, after all, a struggle for power and for favored conceptions of the 'good society."' "' Human rights NGOs act within the
space of transnational civil society to push for their visions of a good
society. In doing so, they "constitute themselves in an assemble of
arrangements so that they can express themselves and their inter' NGOs disagree about the nature and scope of human rights
ests."152
and advance contending approaches to public order and scarcity
among resources. Nonetheless, "an increasingly interdependent and
interpenetrating global community, any human rights orientation that
is not genuinely in support of the widest possible shaping and sharing of all values among all human beings is likely to provoke widespread skepticism."'53 Thus, the trends toward globalization have
pushed legitimacy-seeking human rights NGOs to agreement on
central issues.

150. See generally Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in the Climate Change Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
115 (1998).
151. Bums Weston, Human Rights (visited Apr. 29, 1999) <http://
www.uiowa.edu/-hr98/resourcesbasics/weston2.html>.
152. ALFRED STEPHEN, RETHINKING MILITARY POLITICS: BRAZIL AND THE

SOUTHERN CONE 3-4 (1988).
153. Weston, supra note 151, pg. unavail. online.
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To illustrate, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights
brought an array of human rights NGOs to Vienna where many advanced their own specific human rights claims based on their own
particularistic visions of a good society. Despite divergence among
the tactics and substantive arguments of NGO leadership, the Vienna
participants managed to work together to push State leaders to adopt
a strong statement reaffirming their commitment to universal human
rights. These efforts culminated in the Declarationand Platformfor
Action, which was signed by the representatives of 171 States. The
Vienna Declaration proclaimed:
All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated... [and that] ...[w]hile the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political,
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights
and fundamental freedoms."A

The Vienna Declaration illustrates agreement on central conceptual
issues, however NGOs, like States, continue to disagree with each
other, and with many States, about how these concepts should be realized.
NGOs participate in debates about the nature of human rights
through a variety of tactics that allow them to play vital roles in international human rights lawmaking and law implementing at both
the domestic and international levels.' Local NGOs learn strategies
and gain substantive information through their participation in international networks and the teachings of international law, which is
then employed in efforts to shape the form and operation of domestic

154. Vienna Declaration, supra note 135, para. 5.
155. See David Weissbrodt, The Contribution of International Nongovernmental Organizations to the Protection of Human Rights, in 2 HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 403,406-08 (Theodor

Meron ed., 1984) (examining the contribution of international non-governmental
organizations in protecting human rights). See also Steve Harnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and Iternational Governance, 18 MICH. J.INT'L L.

183 (1997) (looking at NGOs role in international governance); Farouk Mawlawi,
New Conflicts, New Challenges: The Evolving Role of Non-governmental Actors,
46 J. INT'L AFF. 391 (1993).
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' At times, key individuals act as transnational entrepreneurs by
law. 56
playing a key and persistent role in pushing for normative change on
human rights issues.157 In other cases, domestic and international
groups mobilize around key concerns to put pressure on State and
international bodies to adopt and enforce a norm. 5 ' Increasingly, it is
"from the NGOs that new ideas, approaches, and solutions are
springing forth"'59 at the local, national, regional, and international
levels.
The techniques of human rights NGOs include: the monitoring and
surveillance of human rights problems, notification of emergency
situations, the dissemination of information about human rights
norms and violations to the general public, the exchange of such information with other non-State participants in transnational civil society, the reporting of human rights problems to State and international bodies, and ongoing or ad hoc consultation with governments
or international human rights bodies.' 60 The prime weapon of human

156. See generally Nira Bruner Worcman, Local Groups Think Globally, 95
TECH. REV., Oct. 1992, at 36.

157. See, e.g., DAVID LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1993).
158. See generally LAURA MACDONALD, SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY: THE
POLITICAL ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

(1997) (providing examples of this process in Latin America).
159. Patricia Waak, Shaping a Sustainable Planet: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 345, 346
(1995); cf Kal Raustiala, The 'ParticipatoryRevolution' in InternationalEnvironmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537 (1997) (recognizing NGOs as major actors in the formulation, implementation and enforcement of international environmental law). See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-governmental
Organizations in the Development of InternationalEnvironmental Law, 68 CHI.KENT L. REV. 61 (1992) (exploring role of NGOs in the establishment and enforcement of global environmental priorities).
160. See Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Non-governmental Organizations in InternationalDecision-Making Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 45 (1995)
(providing general description of methods used by NGOs to monitor human rights
problems, violations and the exchange of information between NGOs and other
non-State entities). See generally Laurie S. Wiseberg, Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY:
ISSUES AND ACTION 372 (Richard Pierre Clause & Burns Weston eds., 2d. ed.
1992); PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTED NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (Peter
Willetts ed., 1982).
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rights NGOs is the mobilization of shame, that is, the shaming of
governments to abide by human rights norms.'6' By investigating and
publicizing human rights norms, NGOs are extremely influential in
shaping domestic and international agendas on such matters as the
6 women's human rights,' " and human
environment, 6 2 landmines,'
6
1
rights in general.
NGOs also contribute to the development of international law
through the submission of complaints and through international litigation, instituting or intervening in cases as parties, serving as
court-or party-appointed experts, testifying as witnesses, or participating in proceedings as amici.'66 The United Nations human
rights system offers three treaty-based procedures that provide possibilities for individuals and NGOs to submit petitions directly to the
respective committees. 6 7 International organizations contemplated
161. See James Avery Joynce, Mobilization of Shame, in THE NEW POLITICS OF
HLMAN RIGHTS 79 (1978). See, e.g., Phillippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and InternationalLaw, 30 HARV. INT'L L. J. 393, 394 (1989) ("[NGOs]

have been active for many years in identifying threats to the environment, in attempting to force governments to take measures to protect the environment, and in
signaling breaches of existing international environmental regulations.").
162. See Kal Raustiala, States NGOs, and InternationalEnvironmental Institutions, 41 INT'L STUDIES Q. 710 (1997) (explaining that NGOs have become influ-

ential in the international realm because of their ability to investigate and publicize
human rights violations throughout the world); see also PRINCEN & FINGER, supra
note 89.
163. See, e.g., Price, supra note 11, at 615 (discussing role of NGOs in the
transnational dispute over landmines).
164. See, e.g., Martha Alter Chen, Engendering World Conferences: The International Women's Movement and the UN, in NGOS, THE UN & GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 139 (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996) (reviewing
the World Conference on Women and the growth of women's rights issues for
NGOs).
165. See Felice D. Gaer, Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN, in NGOS, THE UN & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51, 51-66 (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996) (considering global recognition of
NGOs and their role in international and transnational disputes).
166. See, e.g., Diane Shelton, The Participationof Non-governmental Organizations in InternationalJudicialProceedings, 88 AM,. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994) (providing study of the increasingly important role played by NGOs in international
litigation).
167. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc.
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the participation of non-State entities in human rights issues.' 68 Ex169
amples of these include the constitutional mandates of UNESCO,
the measures developed by the International Labor Organisation to
protect freedom of association," and the International Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia's rules of procedure and evidence.' The regional systems for the protection of human rights also provide
mechanisms for non-State participation, recognizing in limited cases
the ability of non-State participants to raise claims against States.'

A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, (entered into force March 23, 1976); Optional
Article 14 of the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 A(XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1965), (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted
in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); Optional Article 22 of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A.
Res. 39-46, 39 U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984).
168. See Lord, supra note 128, at 23-24 (describing the role of nongovernmental organizations as constitutionally mandated in the charters and constitutions of certain international organizations).
169. See generally Stephen P. Marks, The Complaint Procedure of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 86 (Hurst Hannum 2d ed., 1992) (providing description of the constitutional provisions of UNESCO).
170. See Lee Sweptson, Human Rights Complaint Procedures of the International Labour Organization, in GUIDE To INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE, supra note 169, at 99 (discussing constitutional provisions of the ILO
and the role of non-governmental organizations).
171. See generally Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedureand Evidence
of the InternationalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507, 508-11
(1994) (examining general rules of procedure and evidence in the conduct of an
investigation and trial as well as discussion of the role of non-State participants in
the process).
172. See Protocol 9 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 6, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 693 (1991), reprinted
in 12 HUM. RTs. L.J. 51 (1991); American Convention on Human Rights, OAS
TREATY SERIES No. 36, arts. 44-47, at 1, OAS OFF. REc. OEA/SER.L/ll.23 Doc
REV. 2 (Nov. 22, 1969); Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, April 8, 1980 (modified on June 29, 1987), arts. 26, 32-41, reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN

SYSTEM 25, 48 OAS/ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1988); African [Banjul] Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982). See also generally Martin A. 6lz, Non-Governmental Organizationsin Regional Human Rights
Systems, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 307 (1997).
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A separate development within the human rights system concerns
extending access to human rights treaty-monitoring bodies for individual non-State participants. Article 71 of the United Nations Charter grants NGOs consultative status with the Economic and Social
Council."" In recent years, NGOs have read this provision broadly
and an increasing number of NGOs are involved in the work of the
United Nations.' The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee
Against Torture all permit NGOs to make formal interventions on
human rights matters. 71 Women's human rights groups also earned a
role for themselves in the monitoring procedure before the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, irrespective of any formal grant of permission. ' 6
NGOs have made a substantial impact on the development of international human rights laws and policies. This is achieved by channeling proposals to States through the consultative and observer
status of NGOs in treaty bodies and international organizations, multilateral conferences, and international meetings such as preparatory
conferences for international conferences.'" One sign of the impact
of human rights NGOs is the reaction of States and international
173. See U.N. CHARTER art. 71.
174. See Peter Willetts, Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations, in
THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UN SYSTEM 31 (Peter Willetts ed., 1996).

175. See generally Sandra Colliver, International Reporting Procedures, in
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 173 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d

ed. 1992) (providing description of process by which NGOs are included in the reporting procedures before human rights bodies).
176. See generally WOMEN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, WOMEN'S HUMAN
RIGHTS STEP-BY-STEP (Julie Mertus et al. eds., 1996).
177. See Christopher Tracy, The Growing Role of Non-governmental Organization, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 413 (1995) (remarks of Donna Sullivan) (distinguishing different types of NGOs working on human rights that fall into the
following overlapping categories: the "old timers" who have long enjoyed consultative status with the United Nations, NGOs that participate largely through regional networks, NGOs that act as coordinators for international conferences, and
NGOs that view themselves as playing the role of technical advisors to other
NGOs and movements). See also Theo van Boven, The Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations in InternationalHuman Rights Standard Setting: A prerequisiteof
Democracy, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L. J.207 (1990) (describing general role of NGOs
in the international setting).
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bodies to their work.7 7 As Donna Sullivan has observed, "[a]s more
NGOs have come into the decision-making settings, we have seen
greater resort to less formal decision-making processes, in other
words, we now see that negotiating [on human rights issues] is occurring in informal sessions to which NGOs have no access....
To overcome these problems, human rights NGOs actively monitor the workings of State, regional, and international bodies established to address human rights abuses. With respect to the World
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, NGOs were instrumental
in exposing the lack of transparency and accountability in the accreditation process. By checking the norms of democratic participation and ensuring some representation by non-State actors, these
transnational NGOs "make democracy safe for the world."'"8
Who, however, will make the work safe for transnational NGOs?
Without democratic safeguards, there is no guarantee that any participants in transnational civil society will be democratic. In fact,
NGOs often violate democratic norms and these transgressions become particularly troublesome when undemocratic NGOs participate
in transnational civil society to affect the enforcement of laws and
policies. 8 ' The undemocratic behavior of NGOs result in many dangers to the conduct of transnational civil law and society.
B. DANGERS OF NGOs THAT VIOLATE DEMOCRATIC NORMS

The operations of NGOs are at times decidedly opaque. NGOs,
acting individually and in networks, often wield influence on decision-making "behind closed doors" and without pluralistic participa-

178. See Tracy, supra note 177, at 422-23 (providing description of State reaction to NGOs in various settings).
179. See id. at 423.
180. See Leslie Paul Thiele, Making Democracy Safe for the World: Social
Movements in Global Politics, 18 ALTERNATIVES 273, 275 (1993) (discussing role
of NGOs and the process by which they monitor the decision making process of
international bodies).
181. See id. at 276 (explaining that a faith-based NGO is run by an authoritarian
figure in a non-transparent and non-participatory manner becomes troubling when
that NGO becomes a force in transnational civil society where it continues to act in
an undemocratic manner and, through such transnational work, begins to bring
about changes in human rights law and policy).
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tion. 82 For example, an insider group of women developed the
agenda of women's human rights groups for the World Conference
on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993.8 These leaders sought to promote inclusion and transparency by operating on a "caucus basis"
through which they performed their agenda-setting work while simultaneously trying to educate individuals from other NGOs to participate in that process.' Nonetheless, the agenda emerging from this
process did not include many minority voices on rights issues, and
the selection procedure of both participants and agenda items was not
transparent to outsiders."" Moreover, the deals struck between individual representatives of NGOs and State leaders were neither the result of quiet lobbying, nor the product of a visible and accessible
process. 186
Considerable power is exercised by institutions of and participants
in civil society, but there is neither a parliament of civil society, nor a
cross-border multiparty electoral process. Accordingly, the institutions of civil society may run against the most basic rule of democracy, namely, to govern with the consent of the governed. For example, international NGOs that have worked over the past ten to twenty
years in consultative status with the United Nations are among the
NGOs least likely to base their policies on the concerns of a welldefined constituency.'7 Studies have found that the closer a NGO is
to the grassroots, the greater its chances at promoting positive social
change because it is more likely to represent a highly motivated and
engaged constituency.'88 Some NGOs in Bosnia, for example, are
182. See Tracy, supra note 177, at 421 (discussing the extent of NGOs influence
on world conferences).
183. See id. at 422-23 (explaining that in the World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna in 1993, NGOs greatly influenced and affected the agenda of the
Conference and the focus on particular issues).
184. See id.
185. See Julie Mertus & Pamela Goldberg, A Perspective on Wi'omen and International Human Rights After the Vienna Declaration: The InsidelOutside Construct, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201, 201-02 (1994).
186. See id. at 203-04 (continuing the discussion of the effect of NGO participation and the hidden process that resulted in the ensuing agreement).
187. See Tracy, supra note 177, at 422-23 (discussing agenda and policies of
NGOs that continually participate on a consultative basis with the United Nations).
188. See, e.g., M. CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS (1983); Oxhorn,
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driven more by opportunism than the goal of working toward an ethnic vision and serving a constituency. Such organizations have only a
temporary and superficial impact on social structures.'89
In another manner, civil society groups may run afoul of democracy by violating with impunity specific human rights closely connected with democracy promotion.' 9° One of the most popular roles
for non-governmental actors in democracy promotion in the 1990s is
the monitoring of elections.' 9 ' Michael Reisman has observed that the
"results of such elections serve as evidence of popular sovereignty
and become the basis for international endorsement of the elected
government."' 92 Few checks exist, however, on the conduct of election monitors. In many cases, untrained volunteers monitor elections
and are not equipped to certify elections as fair and free.9 3 Despite
their best attempts at operating in a fair manner, local NGOs may be
funded beyond their capacity for good management.'9 4 Common
supra note 24, at 267-269 (arguing NGOs that are closely related to its constituency is more likely to have a constructive role in affecting social and political
change). See generally Conference: International Human Rights at the Grassroots:
Putting International Standards to Work for Our Children, University of Iowa
School of Law, Iowa City, IA (Mar. 14-15, 1997) (on file with author).
189. See Ian Smillie, Service Delivery or Civil Society: Non-governmental Organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dec. 1996) [hereinafter Smillie Memorandum] (copy of the manuscript of memorandum sent to non-governmental organizations and donors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on file with author).
190. Cf Anne Orford, Locating the International:Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 443, 469 (1997) (asserting that
international institutions, arguably one component of civil society, have advocated
undemocratic means of achieving liberalization).
191. See Donna E. Arzt, Bridge Over troubled Water: Law and the Emergence
of New Democracies, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 81, 98 n.83 (1996) (describing election-monitoring missions as the "dance craze of the decade"). See
generally David Stoelting, The Challenge of UN-MonitoredElections in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 371 (1992) (discussing a number of elections and
plebiscites monitored by the United Nations as well as other non-governmental organizations between 1956 and 1990).
192. See Reisman, supra note 96, at 868-69 (stating that there are very few
checks available for election monitoring process).
193. See Christopher A. Riley, Neither Free nor Fair: The 1996 Bosnian Elections and The Failure of the U.N. Election-Monitoring Mission, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1173, 1192-97, 1211 (1997) (listing purposes and process by
which election monitoring groups conduct the monitoring process).
194. See id. at 1211 (discussing the ability of NGOs to properly monitor and

1999]

THE PROMISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIIL SOCIET1

1375

problems include NGOs censuring their own members, attacking
other NGOs viewed as competitors, and blocking all but a few privileged elites from participating in their operations.
Applying Franck's theory of legitimacy, ' the actions of civil society groups in such cases are likely to be perceived as undemocratic
and illegitimate. As explained above, specific provisions of the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration, and other human
rights instruments can create a normative cannon that embodies "the
rights of free and equal participation in governance."'" Such rights as
freedom of opinion and expression 97 and peaceful assembly and association 98 create, in Franck's words, a "net of participatory entitlements." ' 99 Nonetheless, the specific entitlements enumerated in the
Universal Declaration and its progeny pertain generally to the rights
of persons vis-A-vis their governments, not to the rights of persons
vis-A-vis non-State or transnational participants. '°° As long as international law fails to articulate a clear and consistent position as to the
responsibility of non-State actors, such actors will continue to neglect these rights. Although there is growing international jurisprucertify the validity of elections).
195. See Franck, supra note 27, at 77 (stating that legitimating power of the
community of nations has as its source governments that derive "their just powers
from the consent of the governed" and by demonstrating "a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind").
196. See id. at 79 (positing that each of these instruments recognizes related specific entitlements as accruing to individual citizens that constitute internationally
mandated restraints on governments).
197. See Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 19.
198. See id. art. 21.
199. Franck, supra note 27, at 79.
200. See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered TransnationalLegal Order?, 9 AM1. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1, 22 (1993) (arguing that an international legal process that does not allow
full participation of non-State actors cannot develop norms that are fully responsive to the needs of the international community); Benedict Kingsbury, Claims By
Nonstate Groups in InternationalLaw, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481, 484 (1992)
(examining the norms developed in the international legal system to address issues
arising in relations between States and non-State groups); P.K. Menon, Individuals
as Subjects of InternationalLaw, 70 INT'L L. REV. 295, 297 (1992) (discussing
broadening of traditional international law doctrine to include individuals as subjects of international lav and to confer on them legal personality even if limited to
certain purposes).
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dence and commentary on non-State actors as subjects of international law,20 ' the message to non-State actors in transnational civil
society is far from clear. The potential for mischief thus is great.
Another problem with transnational civil society as represented by
NGOs is that it is often not strong enough to resist subordination by
the State.0 2 This problem becomes acute when NGOs assume functions that were once the province of States. Social service delivery
and humanitarian relief are examples. 20 3 "Ultimately," Ian Smillie
writes, "there is a question as to how much the 'civil society' discourse and donor infatuation has to do with democracy and human
rights, and how much it has to do with finding cheaper and more ef-°
ficient alternatives to faltering government delivery systems.,,20
Once they become a sort of "public service sub-contractor,, 20 5 NGOs
"are in continual danger of having their local accountabilities and
ethnical principles compromised by the financial and discursive capacity of states to shape their agendas. ' 2° When NGOs are dependent
on States, they no longer fulfill their role as non-State counterparts in

201.

See, e.g., CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-3

(1993) (undertaking an analysis of the position of third parties in international law
through an examination of third party claims); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 76 (1986); Janet E. Lord, Taiwan's Right to be Heard
by the Security Council, in THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER: LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 133 (Jean-Marie

Henckaerts ed., 1996) (arguing that the exclusion of entities other than States from
procedural standing before international bodies is an outdated vestige of the traditional doctrine of international law that only States are subjects of international
law).
202. See Oxhom, supra note 24, at 251-52 (contrasting domestic and transnational civil society and stating that the strength of the former lies in its collective
capacity to resist subordination to the State).

203. See generally Antonio Donini, The Bureaucracy and the Free Spirits:
Stagnation and Innovation In the Relationship Between the UN and NGOs, in

NGOs, THE U.N. AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 67 (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996) (analyzing the changing institutional relationship between the
rapidly evolving NGO world and the more stagnant United Nations).
204. See IAN SMILLIE, THE ALMS BAZAR: ALTRUISM UNDER FIRE-NON-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 237 (1995).

205. See generally BEYOND UN SUBCONTRACTING: TASK SHARING WITH
REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND SERVICE-PROVIDING NGOs (Thomas
G. Weiss ed., 1998)
206. See Otto, supra note 144, at 41.
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transnational civil society. Instead, they form patron-client relationships to improve their positions, thus repeating the old tradition of
strong-State/weak-State clientelism.2 '
For example, the local NGO sector in Bosnia developed "in a distorted way with great attention [by the international community] to
service delivery and with very little attention [by the international
community] to sustainability beyond the promise of completion
dates. 20 8 International donors created a dependency situation through
which local NGOs in Bosnia relied upon them for their very existence. These NGOs must actively promote, or at least not contravene,
the agendas of their donors: individual States or international bodies
composed of States-particularly the United Nations. In the early
stages of the donor process in Bosnia, local NGOs were a cheap
source of service delivery for foreign donors desiring to provide
emergency assistance and psychosocial services. The shift away
from emergency and psycho-social projects to income generating
projects in the mid-1990s left many Bosnian NGOs in despair as they
simply could not continue their programs.2' This focus on inexpensive service delivery via local NGOs was at odds with the creation of
a strong, pluralistic civil society.1 0 Although the donor process in
Bosnia advances the goals of foreigners, it stretches the imagination
to claim that it meaningfully advances Bosnian civil society as very
little is left behind when donors pull out. Time will tell whether and
which foreign promoters of civil society achieved their intended
goals in Bosnia. Those likely to be most successful are those that
worked with grassroots groups on cultivation of their own agenda.
C. LEGAL TRANSPLANT PROJECTS
Problems with transnational civil society are further illustrated by
NGOs at work on "legal transplant" projects. These projects, com-

207. See generally NGOS, STATES AND DONORS: Too CLOSE FOR COMFORT?

(David Hulme & Michael Edwards eds., 1997); Roniger, supra note 20, at 11-14.
208. Memorandum from CARE/CRS/DELPHI to Brenda Cupper (March 19,
1997) (on file with author).
209. See Smillie Memorandum, supra note 189, at iv; Bosnian NGO Interviews,
supra note 138.
210. See Smillie Memorandum, supra note 189, at iv.
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monly termed "rule of law" endeavors,"' attempt to transplant laws
and, in some cases, entire legal systems from one place to another,
usually from a country perceived as "working properly" to one
deemed in great need."' The first wave of such projects occurred after World War II when the victorious allies rewrote the constitutions
of the vanquished to conform to their own ideology."' The second
wave occurred in the 1960s, a time optimistically labeled the Decade
for Development by the United Nations.2t4 During this period of decolonialism, "departing colonial powers hastily imposed carbon
copies of their own documents [and laws], which evolved from different cultural and historical backgrounds.""2 5 At the same time, the
"law and development" movement, crafted by American academics
and private foundations, sent throes of American lawyers abroad,
mainly to Latin America and Africa, to train problem-solving legal
engineers 216 and promote a modem vision of law as an instrument of
211. See John Reitz, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Theoretical Approaches, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND POST-COMMUNIST CHANGE 111, 113
(Robert D. Grey eds., 1997). The "hallmark of the rule of law is the claim most
commonly made for it, namely that under the rule of law, the exercise of all power,
both public and private, is limited by law." Id. The independence of the judiciary is
an important aspect of the rule of law. See, e.g., Ralf Dahrendorf, A Confusion of
Powers: Politicsand the Rule of Law, 40 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1977) (arguing that the
independence of the judiciary may be regarded as the very definition of the rule of
law).
212. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (1974) (providing the classic examination of legal transplants).
213. See, e.g., J. Maki, The JapaneseConstitutionalStyle, in THE CONSTITUTION
OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS 9 (Dan Henderson ed., 1968).
214. See SMILLIE, supra note 204, at 7.
215. See Lis Wiehl, Constitution, Anyone? A New Cottage Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990, at B3 (reporting how countries are turning to United States
scholars in part to win foreign aid, but also for their experience in democracy).
216. See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 14 (1980) (characterizing the American lawyers
sent abroad as micro-level problem solvers to macro-level social engineers).
Gardner further states that:
Law professor Karl Llewellyn's immodest description was most frequently cited by
the law and development movement: "The essence of our craftsmanship lies in skills
and wisdom's; in practical, effective, persuasive, inventive skills for getting things
done, any kind of thing in any field; in wisdom and judgment in selecting the things to
get done; in skills for moving men into desired action, any kind of man, in any field...
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development policy along capitalist and democratic lines."' The primary goals of these programs were to attempt "to promote U.S.-style
legal education and the use of law as a positive instrument of sociopolitical change ..

.""' Within this context, American legal assis-

tance also involved the transfer of American models of the lawyer
and the law. The various models for transfer included:
(1) direct transfer of legal institutions and instruments, (2) indirect transfer of legal concepts and models, (3) invited legal transfer, where the initiative and encouragement for the legal transfer process comes from the
recipient legal culture, and (4) imposed or uninvited legal transfer at the
initiative of the "exporting" legal culture... (5) infused--"premeditated"
or "planned"--processes of legal transfer, direct or indirect, wherein the
initiative comes from the exporting legal culture, [and] (6) more occasional ad hoc borrowing.
29

A proliferation of expert-laden think tanks debated, deployed, and
dissected these models. Ultimately, it was not an orchestrated political campaign to export any particular western model that influenced
local and world politics, but individual experts ability "to employ,
articulate, direct and interpret [the models], whatever their [political]
attitudes might be." ' 0 None of these models worked well at fostering
positive social change in Latin America, and, in short, James
Gardner concludes, "the history of the law and development movement is rather sad. ' ' 2' It is a history of an attempt to transfer the
American legal models that were themselves flawed.
The professional model of the lawyer as pragmatic problem-solver and
legal engineer is flawed by its technocratic character and its lack of any
coherent ethical or conceptual content. Underlying models of legal
thought are in crisis: the prevalent legal instrumentalism is particularly
•We are the trouble shooters."
Id.
217. See generally id.
218. THOMAS CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF

ROMANIA 52 (1996).
219. See GARDNER, supra note 216, at 21-22.
220. ROSENAU, supra note 68, at 334 (describing these traveling experts as
"powerful people," thus emphasizing their inordinate ability to use their own talents of persuasion to change local and global politics).
221. GARDNER, supra note 216, at 22.
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narrow in its perceptions of law and change interactions, and is vulnerable
to authoritarian abuse.222

One of the major shortcomings of the law and development
movement was its failure to understand that multiple kinds of law
can exist in society and locals act according to their own self-interest.
Local people are actors and not mere subjects and they generally turn
' Moreover, the law
"American legal assistance to their own ends."223
and development movement in Latin America ultimately served to
strengthen the hold of anti-democratic elites.224
Whether the lessons of the law and development movement were
heard is questionable. The fall of Soviet-dominated States in the late
1980s and early 1990s has ushered in a new wave of legal transplants225 that duplicates wholesale the techniques of earlier times:
sending in American lawyers in an attempt to reconstruct the local
legal system in a manner more compatible with United States interests.226 The earlier focus on transporting United States methods of legal education was retained, and a new and bolder emphasis on the
wholesale rewriting of local law was added.

222. ROSENAU, supra note 68, at 280.
223. Id. at 287.
224. See generally Jose E. Alverez, Promoting the 'Rule of Law' in Latin
America: Problems and Prospects, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 281
(1991); David M. Trubeck & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States,
1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062 (1975).
225. See Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and By Prestige: Legal Transplants in
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1995) (providing discussion
of the history of borrowing of Western legal models in Central and Eastern
Europe).
226. See generally Sherri Kimmel, For Export Abroad: American Legal KnowHow, 20 PA. LAW. 10 (1998); James Podgers, Helping to Keep a Peace: CEELI
Volunteers Have Quite Impact on Truce in Former Yugoslavia, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1997, at 94; Molly Stephenson, Real Property Lawyers PromoteReform in Central
Europe, 11 PROB. & PROP. 12 (1997); Joan Davidson, America's Impact on Constitutional Change in Eastern Europe, 55 ALB. L. REv. 793 (1992); Charles E.
Anderson, Exporting Democracy: U.S. Lawyers Help Eastern Europe Draft New
Constitutions,A.B.A. J., June 1990, at 18.
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The Central and East European Law Initiative ("CEELI") plays a
central role in such efforts.2- 7 Funded by the United States Agency
for International Development ("USAID"), the American Bar Association ("ABA") and other public and private organizations, CEELI
supports law reform by sending volunteer lawyers to work with local
parliamentarians, judges, law schools, and law offices on-site; organizing workshops, trainings, and exchanges of judges m and lawyers in-country and in the United States; providing legal assessments
of draft legislation and of proposed structural changes in the legal
system, with a focus on privatization and commercial law. In BosniaHerzegovina, a coalition of foreign lawyers, from CEELI, the European Union, OSCE, the United Nations, and the United States Information Agency ("USIA"), have focused on plans for structural
changes in the criminal legal field.2- 9
Some commentators contend that these new efforts differ considerably from those employed in the law and development days because the recipient legal culture invites them to enter!" This claim
cannot apply to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is presently run like an
undeclared protectorate under the mandate of the Dayton Peace Accord, and volition is negligible in this context. Other Eastern European States also have little choice but to accept an army of foreign
legal experts, because international financial institutions and security
groups de facto condition preferential treatment based on their presence. 231 Regardless of inducements by international financiers, local
227. See CAROTHERS, supra note 218, at 52-57 (outlining a case study of CEELI
efforts in Romania). Other players include the United States funded National Endowment for Democracy ("NDI"), visiting legal experts sent by the United States
Information Agency ("USIA"), and the Soros sponsored Open Society Institute
("OS").
228. See id. at 53 (pointing out that programs directed at judges are designed to
foster greater judicial independence).
229. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN
LAW INIATmvE (CEELI), ANNUAL REPORT 1996 (1997); see also Interviews with
CEELI representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Poland, Russia, and
Washington D.C. (1996-1998) [hereinafter Interviews with CEELI Representatives].
230. See Interviews with CEELI Representatives, supra note 229 (finding
CEELI has a policy of not commenting on draft legislation unless it is at the request of the local government and/or other local organizations).
231. See id.
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actors often believe that they must at least listen to the local American legal experts and adapt what they can to suit local needs. Such
needs include: better resources for the legal system, better training
for lawyers, a move from out-of-date legal doctrines, and a springboard into the international economy.232
Many legal transplant efforts do not take root in Eastern Europe
because "[v]ariations in the political, social and economic values
which exist between the two societies make it hard to believe that
many legal problems are the same for both except for on a technical
level., 233 The targets of legal training programs, in particular local
judges, are often "either unable or uninterested in making use of external technical assistance. 234 Problems faced by judges and lawyers
in Eastern Europe are rooted in structural flaws that outside legal experts cannot or do not address: low salaries, especially for judges; inadequate classrooms, courtrooms, and record keeping equipment;
"dead wood," that is, legal officers that simply refuse to change their
ways; a lack of tenure for judges, and the inability to get rid of
judges that are not able or willing to perform their jobs according to
professional standards; a culture of high-level political interference
in judicial matters, widespread corruption, and distrust of law; and
weak political will regarding implementation of legal reforms.23 '
While some of today's sojourners are better trained in the local
languages and culture than their counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s,
many are not, and their efforts are at best "a rather awkward mixture
of goodwill, optimism, self-interest, arrogance, ethnocentricity, and a
simple lack of understanding. 23 6 Energetic traveling American law232. See Interview with Minister of Justice, Judges, and Lawyers in BosniaHerzegovina (July 2, 1998).
233. WATSON, supra note 212, at 4.
234. See CAROTHERS, supra note 218, at 54 (describing legal training programs
in Romania); Interviews with Lawyers and Judges in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Poland,
Romania and Russia (1996-1998) (confirming the general applicability of this remark to other parts of Eastern Europe) [hereinafter Interviews with Lawyers &
Judges].
235. See Interviews with Lawyers & Judges, supra note 234; CAROTHERS, supra
note 218, at 55; Monica Macovei, Legal Culture in Romania, 7 E. EUR. CONST.
REV. 79 (1998).
236. See GARDNER, supra note 216, at 4 (describing the law and development
movement in Latin America).
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yers today, just as in the days of the law and development movement,
often fail to see how their good faith efforts can easily serve to legitimate the interests of a regressive status quo. According to Thomas Carothers, "[e]xtemal assistance cannot create a will to reform
on the part of the relevant authorities; nor can it substitute for a lack
of will to reform.,, 23 7 Even the more self-aware traveling legal experts-and there are many-are likely to find themselves in the position of providing assistance for legal reform in a State where responsible legal authorities are not genuinely committed to reform.2"
Another problem with today's legal transplant projects is unrealistic desires to accomplish too much. Many of today's projects foster
the development of civil society. While commercial legal transplants
may find fertile ground for local adaptation, the civil society rule of
law projects are likely to miss their mark. Laws that create the
structural underpinnings for civil society-for example, by providing
access to the legal process and mechanisms for voting-are necessary for the development of civil society, but they alone do not guarantee the existence of a functioning civil society. Rather, for civil society to work, the community in question must value and view it as
legitimate. Rob Atkinson underscores this problem by stating that
"[c]reating a civil society by legal fiat is an impossible bootstrap operation, both practically and conceptually. In both liberal political
theory and the history of liberal politics, the rule of law is the product
of a prior, prelegal commitment to civil society." "' The transplant of
legal institutions designed to promote such values as participation
and voluntary association will not work in the absence of a prior
commitment to such values.2 On the contrary, the local power
237. CAROTHERS, supra note 218, at 56.
238. U.S.A.I.D., WEIGHING IN ON THE

SCALES OF JUSTICE: STRATEGIC
APPROACHES FOR DONOR-SUPPORTED RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS, ASSESSMENT

REPORT NO. 7 (Feb. 1994).
239. Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentar' on the Professionalism Crusade,
74 TEX. L. REv. 259, 297 (1995).
240. See Roniger, supra note 20, at 8.
Historically, both the idea and the reality of civil society have preceded the development of democracy. There are points of convergence around pluralism and dispersion
of interests and social forces, yet the pluralistic character of civil society neither ensures democracy nor implies a strengthening of the open domain of public life.
Id. Roniger points out that there are societies "that defy the logic of constitutional
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structure will reject such a forced imposition as illegitimate and/or
misused to serve its own needs.14' This problem is endemic to the
nature of social change and legal transplantation, and the most
knowledgeable legal experts will be unable to solve it on their own.
D. CHALLENGES AHEAD

The implications of an undemocratic transnational civil society are
far reaching. Undemocratic civil society not only undermines the legitimacy of non-State participants, but also threatens the legitimacy
of States and all transnational relationships. Democracy is a "doublesided process" in which the State and civil society "become the condition for each other's democratic development.,1 42 Democracy on
the transnational level is good for democracy on the State level and
vice versa. Undemocratic civil society at any level of relationship
can act as a contagion-squelching participation and legitimacy and
thus undermine the potential for positive social change.
The challenge for human rights advocates lies in making transnational civil society democratic in a manner that could lead to positive
social change. The answer lies in giving content to Franck's "democratic entitlement," shaping it so that it can become transformative
democracy. Human rights advocates should take steps to ensure more
accountability and transparency for non-State participants, especially
when they take on State functions. As a first step, the value of participation requires better articulation. Civil society is underdeveloped
democratic legality and exhibit a gap between the formal aspects of public life and
the 'real' workings of the socio-political arena ... " Id. Roniger contends Mediterranean cultures and societies provide good illustrations. See id.
241. See, e.g., Yael Yishai, Civil Society in Transition: Interest Politics in Isreal, 555 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 147, 155 (1998).
[T]he second phase in Israel's history was characterized by institutional changes: the
growing importance of the market and its material products, and the gradual waning of
political parties. These processes formed the setting for the fledgling public interest
movement, challenging state authorities. The reaction of these authorities, however,
was exclusionary. Legal means were taken, and public statements were made, to delegitimize public associations. The state excluded its challengers if not from the political
game, then at least from the centers of power. By denying recognition and legitimacy
to the challenging components of civil society, the state consolidated its power vis-avis civil society.
Id.
242. HELD, supra note 13, at 286.
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where small, participatory, and democratically structured organizations independent of the State are uncommon.2' Further, human
rights dialogue in transnational civil society provides a good illustration of underdevelopment when it is dominated by large, exclusive,
undemocratic organizations.2"
Is it possible to refine the understanding of participation to realize
transformative democratic goals? One of the main roadblocks to
transformative democracy lies in the reality that transnational civil
society reflects disparities in power that are not recognized. Quite
simply, well-financed western NGOs are likely to have more power
than their poorer and non-western counterparts, and the lack of
transparency and accountability in transnational civil society is likely
to keep this power unchecked. There is little incentive for powerful
NGOs to recognize this misbalance, and less powerful groups can be
so marginalized that their protests are not heard. Abdullahi AnNa'im recognizes that "[i]deally participants should feel on an equal
footing but, given existing power relations, those in a position to do
so might seek ways of redressing the imbalance."2 5 Diane Otto goes
further in insisting that "transparency of the operations of global
networks of power, of exploitation and domination, is a vitally important component of transformative dialogue."' 6 Application of
democratic principles to transnational civil society would do more
than add a dose of pluralism. In addition to opening civil society to
more diverse participation, transformative democracy would insist
that all actors behave ethically by questioning any privileges they
enjoy as a result of structural power imbalances. The most powerful
participants of civil society themselves would accept responsibility
for developing mechanisms that can enable them to address inequalities in power.
A related element of a transformative strategy is for the more
powerful agents of transnational civil society to listen to, value, and
incorporate the experiences and wisdom of their less powerful coun-

243. See Price, supra note 11, at 614-16.
244. See id.
245. Abdullahi An-Na'im, What Do We Mean By Universal?, 23 INDEX ON
CENSORsHIP, Sept./Oct. 1994, at 120, 122.
246. Otto, supra note 144, at 33.
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terparts. Although this is the goal of many human rights advocates, it
is rarely carried out in practice. An understanding of a participatory
norm of democracy would provide guidance in shaping procedures
that would bring non-elites into the debate on human rights on their
own terms. As a practical matter, at international meetings discussing
human rights norms, non-elite groups "might be empowered to have
control of agenda-setting, determine the questions of importance, and
run meetings according to procedures they understand., 4 7 These and
similar measures would add meaningful context to the norm of participation. 48
To be transformative, actors in transnational civil society must
commit to exposing the global economic issues that undermine the
ability of some voluntary associations to participate in civil society2149
Many studies indicate that globalization exacerbates economic disparities.25 For example, globalization has encouraged, and in some
cases demanded, privatization of social services. Researchers have
demonstrated, for instance, how privatization of key social services
in Latin America, such as social security, health care, and housing,
has exacerbated exclusion of citizens from community life."' For the
most part, critiques of such changes in the space of transnational civil
society are left to organizations identified as "development" or "economic" groups, and most human rights NGOs have little say in the
matter.252 To fully realize all the goals of the Universal Declaration,
however, this circumstance needs to change. Not only does the failure of human rights NGOs to engage in global economic justice issues result in less attention to such matters, but it also exacerbates
247. Id. at 38.
248. For further exposition on these ideas, see Mertus, supra note 78.
249. See id. at 34.
250. See, e.g., id. at 44 ("[T]he egalitarianism of modernity has supported the
globalization of capital, which has sponsored reduced state obligations with respect
to economic and social rights and deepened the economic disparities between
North and South.").
251. See Oxhorn, supra note 24, at 253 (asserting that the concentration of
power resources in Latin America has stifled the emergence of healthy civil societies).
252. See Michael Posner & Candy Whittome, The Status of Human Rights
NGOs, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 269, 272-76 (1994) (discussing noninvolvement of human rights NGOs in societal changes).
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the conditions that weaken the ability of individuals and NGOs to
participate in any human rights dialogue at all. Without access to
health care, housing, or a living wage, individuals and groups are
hampered in their ability to associate and voice their concerns.' As
such, neglect of global justice issues contributes to the democratic
deficit in transnational civil society.
A transnational human rights movement is better poised to demand that States behave democratically in promoting and protecting
human rights if it strives to act in line with transformative democratic
norms. NGOs that are democratic in the sense described in this Article will be perceived as more legitimate when they call for full realization of the goals of international human rights documents and
when they act in accordance with such norms. This will provide
NGOs with more credible ground on which to demand that international bodies grant them consultative status on all treaty monitoring
bodies2 and that States provide them with a consultative, or at least
information-sharing role, on domestic human rights bodies. NGOs
need not and cannot take on the role of States in promoting human
rights worldwide. Nonetheless, NGOs could do much more in the
future if they are perceived as legitimate and, indeed, if they are legitimate. Defining and realizing the elements of a transformative
democracy would go a long way toward addressing these concerns.

CONCLUSION
The human rights concerns that motivated the creation of the Universal Declaration are still present. The good news is that the world
has changed in ways that can help to give content and effect to the
Universal Declaration's principles. As Stephen Gill has suggested,
globalization and the development of a transnational civil society:
open[s] up new potential for counter hegemonic and progressive forces to
begin to make transnational links, and thereby to insert themselves in a

253. See generally Mertus, supra note 110 (expanding on thesis).
254. Human rights NGOs may want to follow the model of NGO participation in
environmental treaties. See generally Phillippe J.Sands, The Environment Community and InternationalLaw, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 392 (1989) (examining role of
NGOs with respect to international environmental law); PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN
BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992) (describing NGOs
contribution to international environmental law).

1388

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[14:1335

more differentiated, multilateral world order. This would be a way to advance the process of democratization of an emerging global civil society... This might then provide the political space and social possibility to
begin to mobilize for the solution to deep-seated problems of social inequality, intolerance, environmental degradation and the militarization of
255
the planet.

The new space created by globalization, the rise of transnational
civil society, and the ideas and methodologies represented by governance and the right to democratic entitlement, provide new opportunities for non-State participation in human rights standard setting
and enforcement. Non-State actors, in particular human rights NGOs,
have made tremendous advances in their ability to influence the
building of a human rights culture. If they take advantage of the
transformations of space and ideas described above, they can help restructure the international human rights system. By doing so, the
identity of the system itself is altered by democratic governance
norms in a manner receptive to human rights.
Saul Mendlovitz and Merav Datan have noted that whether the
emerging transnational norms of governance will be "human rightsoriented or capital-oriented depends greatly on the nature of participation of transnational civil society and on our ability to discern
emergent structures and to reinforce those we view as humane.""2 6
Humane governance, in Richard Falk's terms, "emphasizes the
25 7
achievement of comprehensive rights for all peoples on earth.
Shaping the structures and practices of humane governance "involves
not only the deepening of democracy in State/society settings, but the
outward extensions of democracy to transnational arenas fashioned
by States, corporations, and banks, and the inward extensions of human rights to villages, rural areas, as well as to schools, homes, the
workplace.",2" The exact texture of democratic governance has yet to
be defined, but non-State actors are at work on definitions and practices that could be applied to themselves and to States as well.

255. Gill, supra note 7, at 311.
256. Saul Mendlovitz & Merav Datan, Judge Weeramantry's Grotian Quest, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 413 (1997).

257. FALK, supra note 7, at 9.

258. Id. at 17.
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Therein lies the promise of transnational civil society for the future
of human rights.

